TWILIGHT OR JUST AN OVERCAST
AFTERNOON?
WILLIAM

H. ALLEN*

When I read the introductory paragraphs of Loren Smith's "deliberately provocative" commentary, I I expected to cheer a lively challenge to
some of the orthodoxies of administrative law. But, when I proceeded
with Judge Smith from the general to the more particular, I found myself
asking unaccustomed questions instead of cheering.
I say unaccustomed questions because it is not customary for me to
ask whether an author is doing justice to the procedures employed by
administrative agencies or to the activities of reviewing courts. Those
institutions have their defenders and do not need me. But Judge Smith's
particulars led me to ask whether he was being just in his criticism of
them. I shall try to explain why in what follows. I hope that what I say
will indicate why the present state of what Judge Smith refers to as the
judicialization of the administrative process leaves me with the feeling
not so much of twilight descending into darkness but of an ordinary
overcast afternoon that could delight us by turning to bright sunlight or
could turn darker and awe us with thunder and lightning and drench us
with rain.
I.
I found an initial difficulty in discerning the main burden of Judge
Smith's argument. He certainly believes that government tries to do too
much governing. The distinction critical to his commentary is the difference between "decisions of will"-" 'political' or 'democratic' or 'policy'
decisions"-and "decisions of logic"-legal or judicial decisions; 2 one is
left in no doubt that the "decision of will" that Judge Smith will usually
favor is the decision to do nothing.3 He says at one point that he "would
argue" that the primary cause of overproceduralization "is an attempt by
*

Member of the District of Columbia Bar.

1. Smith, Judicialization:The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427, 427 (editor's
abstract).
2. Id. at 430.
3. In an epigraph he quotes Lord Acton: "The danger is not that a particular class is unfit to
govern. Every class is unfit to govern." Id. at 428 (quoting LORD ACTON, LETTERS OF LORD
ACTON TO MARY GLADSTONE 93 (H. Paul ed. 1904)).
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government to do too much."'4 To the extent that Judge Smith means to
say that the only solution to the problems that have brought us to his
"twilight" is for the government to withdraw from many or even most of
its present activities, I have no real response. But I also take him to be
arguing that government, even at its present level of activity, would be
better conducted if rid of the "fallacy ...that we can make social and
economic decisions by means of formal processes and legal procedures
without the exercise of political will."'5 On that ground, I can try to meet
him.
Judge Smith begins his argument by stating that "[w]e have come to
believe that public hearings, public disclosure of all documents relevant
to a given issue, and trial-type methodologies for testing ideas will lead to
'better' social and economic policies by government decisionmakers
....

.6

Further, he writes, "[t]his attitude leads to an excessive focus on

'7
the process rather than the substance of governmental decisions."
There are ambiguities here. I am not sure who "we" are. Some of
us, in one or another of our capacities, surely do focus on governmental
processes more than on substantive outcomes. 8 Judge Smith chaired the
Administrative Conference of the United States when he wrote his article, 9 and ACUS has just such an institutional focus. Governmental
processes for dealing with citizens and judicial review of resulting governmental actions approximately comprehend the field of administrative
law. That there are those who concentrate on administrative law as thus
understood might be regarded as a simple division of labor-there are
plenty of others whose principal concern is "the substance of governmental decisions." Perhaps Judge Smith's complaint is that those who focus
on process have been too influential with policymakers. If this is true, his
thesis is clearly stated by reversing the cause-and-effect order of the two
thoughts that I have quoted: the "excessive focus" of some on process
has led to a general belief that a proliferation of procedures-hearings,
especially trial-type hearings-and the opening of government decision
processes and sources of government data will necessarily lead to better
economic and social policies.
4. Id. at 459.
5. Id. at 429.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. I do not mean that practitioners, as practitioners, care about procedures except as they
assist or impede the pursuit of the client's goals. I mean that some practitioners, like some scholars,
are more concerned with the quality of agency procedures than with whether what the agency is
doing substantively makes any sense-whether the agency should even be ruling on the client's
application.
9. Smith, supra note 1, at 427 n.*.
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There is the germ of an idea here. I would agree with Judge Smith
that, if there is any such general belief, it is quite mistaken. For their
own benefit and perhaps for the benefit of society, those whose focus is on
process probably should look more closely and more often at what their
procedures are being used for.
For example, the Civil Aeronautics Board employed a splendid set
of procedures in airline route cases that enabled those contentious cases
to be disposed of with great efficiency (if not always with great dispatch).10 Perhaps the nation would have been better off if the lawyers,
both in government and out, who were responsible for developing, refining, and using the CAB's procedural rules had been concerned with the
question whether anything socially beneficial resulted from their application. Perhaps, but not surely. Although the reasons for deregulating the
airlines, and doing away with route cases, are not hard to grasp, there is
nothing in the training of lawyers that makes them especially fitted to
develop and expound those reasons."
My appeal to the idea of division of labor between those concerned
with process and those concerned with substance would probably not
satisfy Judge Smith. I think he would insist that those who focus on
process should assist in "reconstruct[ing] a constitutional foundation
upon which to rebuild a coherent and effective administrative law" and
join "the search for a true theory of administrative law." 12 He would
have them ponder the proper ends of government, the nature of citizens'
rights against government, and the proper division of power among the
branches of government.1 3 The endeavor would undoubtedly be ennobling and perhaps even productive. Yet even in a government that was
constructed on a new constitutional foundation, there would remain concerns about the way government dealt with its citizens and the means of
ensuring the legality of governmental actions. I do not believe that all of
these concerns would be answered by the new consensus on the goals of
government, citizens' rights, and separation of powers. In the same way,
10. Judge Merritt Ruhlen's admirable handbook for administrative law judges reflects his long
experience as a hearing examiner with the CAB working with that agency's rules. See M. RUHLEN,
MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (rev. ed. 1982).

11. In any event, we may too easily exaggerate the extent to which the lawyers who create,
work with, and comment upon agency procedures are blind to whether what the agency is doing is
benefiting society. On occasion, those concerned with process do focus on substance. In the aftermath of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), a lot of lawyerly attention was
paid to the procedures that the Federal Power Commission could use in regulating natural gas producer prices. See, eg., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). A large number of the
lawyers concerned with FPC procedures had views as citizens, as representatives of clients, or as
public servants on the wisdom of producer price regulation-and expressed those views.
12. Smith, supra note 1, at 466.
13. See id. at 457-66.
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I believe that there are issues of administrative procedure and judicial
review that cannot be attributed to our having gone as far astray as Judge
Smith believes we have in defining the goals of government and the rights
of citizens against government and in muddling the separate powers of
the branches of government.
II.
In addressing these issues, there is a question of the proper perception of the state of administrative procedure. Judge Smith speaks of the
"expanding use of trial-type procedures for making governmental decisions" 14 and, citing a collection of the hybrid rulemaking statutes that
Congress has enacted in the last several years, states that "[o]ver the last
generation Congress has made the internal processes of administrative
decisionmaking less and less discretionary, and more and more formal."15 He also mentions the so-called "due process revolution," saying
that the "right to a more or less formalized hearing has come to be held
as an article of faith." 16 He thereby describes one perception of where we
stand in respect of the use of formal procedures in the federal government: agency procedures have become more formal, and the movement
toward greater formality is still in progress. But there is another perception. It emphasizes developments other than Goldberg v. Kelly 17 and the
hybrid rulemaking statutes. It emphasizes Florida East Coast,18 the
Food and Drug Administration's summary judgment procedures, 19 and
Vermont Yankee. 20 This conflicting perception is that federal agencies in
the last several years have become less subject to requirements that they
pursue formal procedure in making their more important decisions-the
decisions that are most nearly Judge Smith's decisions of will.
My impression is strong that, despite the due process revolution and
despite what Judge Smith refers to as "the growth of an enormous administrative judiciary in the executive branch, ' 21 courtroom-type procedure is followed less often in the making of important governmental
decisions than it was a generation ago. True enough, the number of administrative law judges and other members of the administrative judici14. Id. at 428.
15. Id. at 449.
16. Id. at 459-60.
17. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
18. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
19. For a decision describing, and upholding, these procedures, see Weinberger v. Hynson,
Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
20. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.

519 (1978).
21. Smith, supra note 1, at 458.
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ary has grown since the first census of hearing examiners was taken after
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act forty years ago, but
they are not making the decisions in major ratemaking and licensing
cases that were the staple of administrative trial-type proceedings then
and for some years after. Today, they are deciding questions such as
whether people are entitled to social security benefits because of disability
22
or to black lung benefits.
It is possible of course to make decisions of the latter type without
an evidentiary record. The Veterans Administration does not use a trial23
type procedure in deciding whether a veteran is entitled to benefits.
But it is no innovation to have the question whether a person has been
disabled by injury or disease decided on the basis of sworn testimony and
evidence. The use of trial-type procedures in such cases does not seem to
me proof of a judicialization of the administrative process. Indeed, the
social security disability cases are tried in a way that is much more informal than any judicial proceeding. The administrative law judge not only
presides but also assists the applicant in developing his case; the applicant is typically not represented by counsel and is never opposed by
counsel representing the government. 24
This is not to say that there are not some dubious uses of the evidentiary, trial-type proceeding. Recently, the Federal Communications
Commission, in awarding licenses for cellular mobile telephone services
in the nation's thirty largest markets, employed a formal evidentiary
hearing.2 5 Although the FCC streamlined the hearing process, the spectacle, reminiscent of the notorious television license cases, is again the
development of an evidentiary record of facts pertaining to the license
applicants and projections of the service they propose; the assessment of
their cases according to criteria designed to enable the agency to choose
between them; and a want of rationality in the process of choice-the
facts typically admit of no rational differentiation, and the projections
may or may not have anything to do with the service that the successful
applicant will in fact offer.
The formal hearing cases to which I have just referred are not inconsistent with Judge Smith's thesis that decisions of will-political decisions-should be tested against standards consisting of "moral values
22. See Lubbers, FederalAgency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forestand the Trees, 31 FED.
B. NEws & 3. 383 (1984).
23. See J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 264-65 (1985).

24. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.3, at 313-14 (2d ed, 1979)
(describing Social Security Administration's formal adjudications).
25. For a history of the FCC's evidentiary hearings for cellular mobile telephone systems, see
Cellular Mobile Systems of Illinois, Inc. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 214, 216-22 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Cellular
Mobile Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 182, 184-96 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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derived from the society's culture and traditions" 26 and not against the
standard of lawyers' logic or rationality, and that such decisions are not
necessarily well made if legalistic processes are used in making them. In
the benefits cases, the decision of will is that people who are disabled can
collect social security benefits before they attain the prescribed age (or
that people suffering from black lung disease are to be compensated).
The identification of qualifying individuals seems not to be a decision of
will, but one susceptible to the logic of judicial decision. So is the choice
of the company to provide cellular mobile telephone service in a certain
city different from the decision that the government will limit entry into
that market. The worst that can be said of the use of evidentiary hearings to choose the licensee is that it is a wasteful practice.
There are, to be sure, closer cases, where policy issues are not always
easily marked off from what Judge Smith, referring to one of the closer
cases, rate regulation, describes as "the subsidiary question whether a
specific rate.., is reasonable. '2 7 Judge Smith indicates that it "can be
argued with some force" that the Administrative Procedure Act created
"a logical allocation between decisions of will and decisions of logic" by
taking as a given the "majoritarian decision of will to regulate rates in the
railroad industry, for example," but enabling "the affected parties to argue their case to the body politic" on the "subsidiary question" of the
reasonableness of a particular rate. 28 I cannot tell whether Judge Smith
accepts the argument in its application to the example he gives. His only
comment is that it is sometimes not fully recognized that the "political
compromise" in the APA's allocation between decisions of will and decisions of logic "gives only limited protection to the affected private individuals" because "the APA was intended to guarantee ... a 'right' to a
'29
'fair' hearing, not a 'fair' result." So?
Despite the mysterious portentousness of this comment, Judge
Smith is not really concerned with anything so trivial as the fact that the
fairest procedures sometimes do not produce fair or just results. His concern is rather that the fair or just result as defined by logic, which fair
procedures are supposed to bring about, is not necessarily the wise or
prudent result that a decision of will would yield. He would emphasize,
in the particular example he has chosen, the elements of policy that intrude into the decision whether a carrier's or a utility's rate is reasonable.
One moves even closer to the point I believe he is making when one
moves from traditional rate regulation to, say, the somewhat less tradi26. Smith, supra note 1, at 429.

27. Id. at 439.
28. Id.
29. Id.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1986:276

tional province of the Federal Trade Commission. Congress made the
decision of will in 1914 that it would empower the FTC to act against
unfair methods of competition without giving the FTC a definition of
those methods. 30 In 1938 Congress broadened the agency's mandate to
include the elimination of unfair or deceptive acts or practices-again
undefined. 3 1 For most of its history, the FTC made its decisions about
what methods, acts, or practices were to be condemned in individual formal-hearing cases.
In 1975, Congress, in the Magnuson-Moss Act, confirmed, or created, the FTC's power to define by rule what are unfair or deceptive
practices. 32 Congress subjected the agency's exercise of its rulemaking
power to procedural requirements that have made Magnuson-Moss synonymous with the evils of hybrid rulemaking. Paradoxically, I doubt
that the FTC would especially interest critics of the proceduralization of
government if it had not received this rulemaking power and had continued to regulate through its even more formal evidentiary proceedings.
But conferring rulemaking power on the agency and hedging that power
with trial-type formalities have made the FTC the subject of a great deal
33
of critical commentary concerning its rulemaking procedures.
It is not clear to me what the critics would do differently. Judge
Smith might say that the government should not be defining what is unfair or deceptive in any circumstance. But we need not accept that as an
answer because I do not understand Judge Smith to deny that there are
market failures-what Judge Smith refers to as "ignorance of users and
purchasers of goods with respect to complex or technical issues" 34-that
justify governmental intervention on some occasions. Thus, even if many
government activities are trimmed away, there will remain some functions of the kind the FTC now performs. And we shall have to decide
how, procedurally, those functions are to be carried out.
It is possible, of course, for Congress to assume more of the functions-Congress could decide in the first instance what acts constitute
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. That alternative was considered
30. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719-21 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
31. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111-14
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
32. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FederaI Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982)).
33. See generally Boyer, Executive Summary of Barry B. Boyer Report. Trade Regulation
Rulemaking Proceduresof the Federal Trade Commission, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1979 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 41 (1979); Boyer, Phase II Report
on the Trade Regulation Rulemaking Proceduresof the FederalTrade Commission, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1980 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 33 (1980).
34. Smith, supra note 1, at 435.
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when the Federal Trade Commission Act was being considered in
1914.35 It was rejected in favor of conferring on the FTC the broad mandate that, as amplified in 1938, the agency still operates under.
36
Judge Smith is very critical of broad congressional mandates,
though I doubt that he believes that in every case Congress can or should
be specific and leave agencies no room to exercise judgment. How, then,
is the agency operating under a broad mandate to proceed? Judge Smith
presumably would not deny that the agency should inform itself; he
would not substitute the darkness of ignorance for the twilight of the
half-understood. If we make that assumption, the Magnuson-Moss procedures deserve to be evaluated according to how well they inform the
policy judgments that the FTC has to make; their existence is not neces'37
sarily evidence of "systemic dysfunction.
I have had some experience with the Magnuson-Moss procedures
and have become, as compared with most of my colleagues, something of
a fan. The rulemaking I was involved in was long, extending over more
years than I-as one writing more or less in defense of the status quoshould like to admit. Some of it was tedious. Much more of the length
of the proceeding was attributable to waiting for the Commission or its
staff to do something-to make their decisions of will-than to the somewhat tedious procedures. This waiting was principally responsible for
the ten years that passed from the time the trade regulation rule was
proposed until the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari to review a court of appeals decision sustaining the rule that the FTC
adopted. 38 Though I pass no judgment on whether the country suffered
from the delay, I believe that the sometimes tedious procedures did contribute to making a better rule than the rule that was proposed. I cannot,
therefore, on the basis of my experience, condemn the procedures as
dysfunctional.
III.
We get even closer to Judge Smith's point and into the role of judges
with his discussion of Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v. State
4
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,3 9 a main subject of his essay. 0
35. See S.REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914) (declining to adopt precise definition of
"unfair trade practices" because "there were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20
of them into the law it would be quite possible to invent others").
36. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
37. Smith, supra note 1, at 456.
38. American Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.

1185 (1986).
39. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
40. Smith, supra note 1, at 452-56.
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The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rescinded a requirement that automobiles be equipped with passive restraints-airbags
that would be activated by a jolt or seatbelts that buckle automatically.
The agency had imposed the requirement during the Carter Administration, and it rescinded it during the Reagan Administration. The rescission was set aside first by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, whose decision was then reviewed by the Supreme
Court. 4 1 The Supreme Court-agreed that the rescission had to be set
aside as irrational. 42 On one issue the Justices were unanimous: The
agency had concluded that the passive restraints requirement would be
ineffective because (1) the automobile manufacturers would choose to install a type of automatic belt instead of airbags, (2) belts of that type are
relatively easy to immobilize, and (3) many car owners would immobilize
them. The agency did not apparently consider the possibility of making
the regulation effective by requiring airbags without a passive-belt alter43
native. The Justices thought that failure irrational.
Judge Smith deals with the case principally as an instance of intrusive judicial review, describing it as a case in which "the courts were used
to reverse a considered decision of will."'44 Judge Smith thus treats the
case almost as if NHTSA, in deciding to rescind the passive restraint
requirement, had anticipated and acted on advice later given to it by
Antonin Scalia when he was still a mere law professor. After the court of
appeals decision and before the Supreme Court had taken the case,
Scalia, writing as chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the
American Bar Association, said that on remand "it would be refreshing
and instructive if, instead of (or at least in addition to) blowing smoke in
our eyes with exhaustive technical and economic data,... [the agency]
said flat-out: 'It is our judgment that people should not be strapped in
cars if they don't want to be; nor should they have to spend substantial
sums for airbags if they choose otherwise.' A political judgment, the retribution or reward for which will be meted out by Congress, or at the
'45
polls, but not in the courts."
The agency, of course, had not purported to make any such political
judgment, any such decision of will, in its initial rescission. It had
spewed out quite a good deal of "technical and economic data" by which,
41. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 242 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
42. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46.
43. Id. at 46-51 (opinion of the Court); id. at 57-58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
44. Smith, supra note 1, at 455.
45. Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 AD. L. REV. v, xi (1982). As the title indicates, thenChairman Scalia was making very much the same point as Chairman Smith.
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it said, it was led to the conclusion that the passive-restraint requirement
would not be effective.
It is certainly true, as Judge Smith writes, that "[t]he substantive
issue underlying the procedural dispute in State Farm was, after all, a
classic political controversy. '4 6 But the agency did not treat what it had
done as the resolution of a political controversy. It sought with its technical and economic data to justify its decision by reference to the criteria
of the statute it was administering, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. Those criteria are indeed broad, as Judge Smith
points out. In their breadth and the breadth of other statutes Judge
Smith finds a paradox: "[P]erhaps the most important way in which Congress has contributed to the limiting of agency discretion and the
judicialization of the administrative process has been the granting of
broad substantive mandates to the agencies to fulfill their statutory purposes." 47 Judge Smith believes that broad mandates invite reviewing
courts, provided with no real statutory standards of decision, to become
the "arbiters" of "agency policy direction."48 There is a large element of
truth in this.49
More dubious, however, is Judge Smith's statement that "we may
have reached the point where the decisionmaking vacuum [is] routinely
filled by judicial process."5 0 Examples of judicial policymaking are plain
for anyone to see, some of them without the benefit of broad statutory
mandates. 5 ' But it is extravagant to suggest that they are routine.
Courts are thought generally respectful of broad agency mandates to fix
just and reasonable rates, 52 to license in accordance with the public convenience and necessity,5 3 and even to prohibit unfair or deceptive practices.5 4 Moreover, if the State Farm case is offered as an example of a
routine substitution of the policy judgments of the courts for those of the
46. Smith, supra note 1, at 453.
47. Id. at 452.
48. Id.

49. See R.

MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE CouRTs: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT

(1983). In this book, the author states on the first page the theme that he develops persuasively over
the nearly 400 following pages: "The federal courts ...have announced sweeping rulings on policy
issues left unresolved by existing legislation, often expanding the scope of government programs in
the process."
50. Smith, supra note 1, at 456.
51. The reader of MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978), and MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978), can judge whether the court of appeals or the Federal
Communications Commission was more responsible for making the policy decision that ordinary
long-distance telephone service should be competitive.
52. See, eg., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
53. See, eg., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
54. See, eg., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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political branches, Judge Smith should consider just what the Court professed to be doing. Is it really too much for a court to ask an agency
deciding what people generally refer to as the airbags case to explain why
it does not prescribe an airbags-only regulation if it believes a more general passive-restraint regulation will be ineffective because manufacturers
will use something other than airbags to comply with it and recalcitrant
motorists will be able to immobilize those other things?
In short, no one favors judicial meddling in agency business. Nevertheless, judges do meddle. Their meddling is not so common as Judge
Smith makes it. Moreover, meddling is not an inevitable concomitant of
broad statutory authorizations to agencies. More conscientious fulfillment by Congress of its duty to make political decisions of will by resolving issues it now leaves to agencies would not eliminate all the meddling.
Finally, meddling is to some extent in the eye of the beholder. What to
one appears as an assumption of the policymaking power by a reviewing
court appears to another as an insistence upon minimal agency rationality in the making of policy.
IV.
It is interesting that Justice Scalia, the former professor and Section
chairman, sat in review of another decision of the Reagan Administration's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration when he served
on the Court of Appeals.5 5 It was another case in which NHTSA acted
to ease the burden of a regulation that had been issued under the Carter
Administration.5 6 The issue before the court of appeals was the legality
of the NHTSA decision to reduce from 5 to 2.5 miles an hour the speed
of impact that automobile bumpers must be able to withstand.5 7 Judge
Scalia wrote the opinion sustaining the NHTSA decision. He did not
say: This is a decision of political will taken pursuant to a broad congressional mandate to adopt bumper standards that will save motorists
money, and I am not going to interfere. Instead, he wrote a 32-page
opinion analyzing in quite traditional (though unconventionally lucid)
style the specific legal challenges that were raised against the decision.
Judge Scalia's response to one of these challenges evokes what he
had written in reference to the airbags case, before he took on the responsibility of judging, on the desirability of agencies being more forthrightly
political in making their decisions 58-a theme adopted by Judge Smith.
One of the petitioners pointed to the coincidence in time between the
55.
56.
57.
58.

Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1340-42.
Id. at 1358.
See supra text accompanying note 45.
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publication in 1981 of a White House press release entitled "Actions to
Help the U.S. Auto Industry," which included a proposal to modify the
bumper standard, and NHTSA's publication of its notice of proposed
rulemaking dealing with the bumper standard. 59 The petitioner asserted
that the decision to modify the standard was based on the "impermissible
ground of aiding the U.S. automobile industry. ' 60 Judge Scalia responded that "[t]here seems to us nothing either extraordinary or unlawful in the fact that a federal agency opens an inquiry into a matter which
the President believes should be inquired into."' 6 1 Judge Scalia was willing to assume, on the basis of the press release, that NHTSA officials
expected "that the President would be pleased if the agency ended its
rulemaking by reducing the existing standard, and disappointed if it left
the current rule in effect." ' 62 But he found it "entirely absurd to suggest
that a delegated decision is vitiated by the mere knowledge that the superior would have preferred it to come out the way it did."' 63 He pointed
out that the new bumper regulation "was adopted only after ... painstaking and intricate analysis." 64 Then, after noting some of the frailties
of the old rule and the apparent responsiveness of its promulgators to
expressions of congressional desires, he finally rejected the suggestion
"that we should reinstate the old rule because the new one bears evidence
that the purity of reason has been distorted by politically derived value
'65
judgments.
Thus, for Scalia, the judge, there is room for both "exhaustive technical and economic data" and "politically derived value judgments."
The latter are not improper intruders so long as the data are put together
in such a way as rationally to justify a decision that can be squared with
statutory criteria. That is an imperfect and uncertain world, in which
judgments are going to differ on how faithful agencies have been to their
data and to their statutes, on the one hand, and to the President on the
other, and on how faithful judges have been to the institutional limitations on their role. But it does not seem to me an altogether bad world.
It is more nearly the slightly overcast world of administrative law that I
see about us than Judge Smith's darkening twilight.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id.
Id.

